Description
Dive into the thought-provoking world of 'On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects' by Caspar Hare, an intriguing exploration of egocentric presentism and solipsism. In this groundbreaking work published by Princeton University Press in 2018, Hare challenges conventional understandings of first-person experience and the nature of awareness. With a compelling argument, he invites readers to reconsider the philosophy of self and perceptions that define our consciousness. This trade paperback delves into how our unique perspectives contribute to our beliefs about existence and the world around us, elevating the discourse on personal identity and ethics. Hare's insightful analysis addresses long-standing philosophical dilemmas regarding self-awareness, the significance of individual experience, and the interplay between self-interest and collective good. Whether you are a philosophy enthusiast, a student of metaphysics, or simply someone intrigued by deep existential questions, this book offers a fresh viewpoint that is both accessible and intellectually stimulating. Each page is crafted to provoke thought and inspire discussion about the very essence of existence. Order your copy today and embark on a journey through the complexities of philosophical thought. Note: Shipping for this item is free. Please allow up to 6 weeks for delivery. Once your order is placed, it cannot be cancelled.
Note: Shipping for this item is free. Please allow up to 6 weeks for delivery. Once your order is placed, it cannot be cancelled.
Condition: BRAND NEW
ISBN: 9780691178035
Format: Trade paperback (US)
Year: 2018
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Description:
Caspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." There is, in other words, something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. On Myself and Other, Less Important Subjects represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. Few contemporary thinkers have taken solipsism seriously.
But Hare maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is in indeed defensible, and that it is uniquely capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good. This formidable and tightly argued defense of a seemingly absurd view is certain to provoke debate.
Note: Shipping for this item is free. Please allow up to 6 weeks for delivery. Once your order is placed, it cannot be cancelled.
Condition: BRAND NEW
ISBN: 9780691178035
Format: Trade paperback (US)
Year: 2018
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Description:
Caspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." There is, in other words, something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. On Myself and Other, Less Important Subjects represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. Few contemporary thinkers have taken solipsism seriously.
But Hare maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is in indeed defensible, and that it is uniquely capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good. This formidable and tightly argued defense of a seemingly absurd view is certain to provoke debate.